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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of inductive derivations of personal views from
experiences focusing on limited trials and partial memories. The theory allows us
to discuss how a player might simplify his view of a complicated situation. Two new
concepts of marked information pieces and tested actions are introduced for this
purpose. Each player accumulates local memories as long-term term memories up
to marked pieces and tested actions, and constructs a view. At unmarked pieces, he
behaves following his prescribed regular behavior pattern without thinking about it.
A derived view is typically small, partial, and sometimes prejudiced relative to the
original game situation. This paper studies the emergence of such views. One result
is the characterization of a Nash equilibrium relative to the relevant domain of the
objective game based on the limited and partial views of the individual players.
1. Introduction
Game theory has been successful in describing how to play a game when the rules are well
described and well understood by the players. However, the theory does not describe
the origin of the beliefs of the players about the rules and structure of the game. A new
theory called inductive game theory can be used to unearth the origin and emergence of
individual beliefs/knowledge on the structure of a socio-economic situation. The theory
is “inductive” in the sense that it describes how a player (an individual person) builds
his beliefs/knowledge from his experiences.
Kaneko-Matusi [10] initiated this theory in the context of “festival games” study-
ing the issues of discrimination and prejudice. In this theory, prejudices emerge from
∗The authors are partially supported by Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research No.106330003, Ministry
of Education, Science and Culture, and Australian Council Discovery Grant DP0560034.
†Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan
(kaneko@shako.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp)
‡Department of Economics, School of Business, Bond University, Gold Coast, QLD 4229, Australia,
(Jeﬀrey_Kline@bond.edu.au)
limited experiences and limited understandings of the game situation. Kaneko-Kline
[9] gave a more entire discourse on inductive game theory touching on various steps of
induction, e.g., memories, experiences, derivations of views, and their behavioral im-
plications. That paper gave positive results on how the beliefs of a player might be
inductively derived from his experiences. On the negative side, it pointed out how a
player’s observational and memory capabilities might cause diﬃculties in the various
steps of his long inductive processes. Success at avoiding those diﬃculties relied on the
choice of an appropriate domain of accumulated experiences and memory function. In
one successful case of that paper, however, the domain may become large and unman-
ageable for a player in a typical game situation.
In the present paper, we will focus on much smaller domains of accumulated experi-
ences, which are made possible by the introduction of the notions of “marked (informa-
tion) pieces” and “tested actions”. These notions allow us to use inductive game theory
to study how players might simplify and manage complex social game situations. We
start with one motivating example, which we will use throughout the paper to illustrate
our results. After this example, we will give a brief historical review on related works.
Coordination Game with Precision ΓkC (1): Suppose that an objective extensive
game is played by two players and has k rounds. In each round, each player i chooses a
pair of actions (ai, bi) from {0, 1}×{1, 2, 3}. The a-type action ai is more payoﬀ relevant
than the b-type action bi for both players. At each round if they succeed in coordinating
both actions, they get the highest payoﬀ. However, the payoﬀs from coordinating the
a-type actions are rapidly decreasing as the rounds proceed. The game structure is
depicted for the case of k = 1 in Fig.1.1. For our purpose, the information structure
in the extensive game can be arbitrary, but we assume that each player can distinguish
his previous actions at each round.
A possible profile of actions is written as a vector ((a11, b11), ..., (a1k, b1k)), ((a21, b21),
..., (a2k, b2k)), where (ait, bit) is the action taken by player i = 1, 2 at round t = 1, ..., k.
Since each endnode of the game can be expressed as a profile of actions, we can specify
the payoﬀ to player i as
hi((a11, b11), ..., (a1k, b1k)), ((a21, b21), ..., (a2k, b2k))
=
kP
t=1
(1− |a1t − a2t|)/10t−1 +
kP
t=1
(2− |b1t − b2t|)/104.
It would be better for each player to be precise for the choice of an a-type action in
the beginning, but he doesn’t need to be precise at later rounds or for the choice of the
b-type action.
Consider the size of a game with k = 5 rounds. The first round ends with 6×6 = 62
possible nodes, and in the second round, the same size tree is concatenated to each
endnode of the first round. At the end of the second round, we have 62 × 62 nodes.
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Figure 1.1:
Continuing in the same manner, the number of endnodes in the entire game is
62×5 = (65)2 = 7, 7762 = 60, 466, 176. (1.1)
Here we see that a simple game can become gigantic and potentially unmanageable for
a player when the number of rounds increases. It is fair to say that this situation with
k = 5 may still be regarded as not large in the standard game theoretic sense as well as
in the ordinary social sense. One question we address is this paper is how a player might
simplify this kind of a game in order to understand it and make a strategic decision.
Our starting point for inductive game theory is that a player has no a priori knowl-
edge about the game structure before he plays it. He will learn about the payoﬀ struc-
ture, number of rounds, sequence of moves, and actions only from playing the game. In
order to learn the five round game in its entirety, for example, a player would need to
experience over 60 million paths! In many social situations, individuals have far fewer
experiences. Even if one did have such a large set of experiences, he would surely forget
some parts. Additionally, it is very questionable that he would be able to observe all the
aspects of the game from playing it, e.g., the strategies and payoﬀs of the other players
might not be observed by him.
In a situation with a “large” structure, a player focuses on what he views as im-
portant. First, he marks the information that he views as important, which we will call
“marked information pieces”. He might also try out only some of his available actions to
induce diﬀerent experiences, which we will call “tested actions.” These tests are made by
a player as a deviation from what we call his “regular behavior”. The notion of “regular
behavior” plays a crucial role in inductive game theory. If a player wants to learn about
the situation by changing his own actions, he needs to assume that the behaviors of the
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other players have some regularity. Otherwise, he could not conclude whether his trial
or other players’ (irregular) behaviors caused a change in his observations.
The regular behavior in a social situation is specified as a strategy profile in our
theory. This prescribes an action to be taken by a player in each contingency that
might arise. For example, in the five round coordination game Γ5C , the (information-
independent) regular behavior might be for player 1 to choose ((0,2),(1,1),(1,2),(0,3),(0,1))
and for player 2 to choose ((1,3),(1,1),(0,2),(0,2),(0,3)). The path induced by this reg-
ular behavior in the first round is the dark line in Fig.1.1. Over the five rounds, these
give player 1 a payoﬀ of 0.1017. The best that player 1 could hope for is found by
mimicking the strategy of player 2, which gives him and his opponent 1.1121 each.
Consider a possible analysis by player 1. Suppose that he presumes that the only
important pieces of information in this game are the first round choice and the payoﬀ
information. He now marks the root piece and any endpieces he experiences. How many
endpieces he experiences will depend on how many experiments he makes. Suppose that
he will only experiment with his a-type action at the root piece. His tested actions then
include the regular behavior (0,2) as well as (1,2) in the first round. In rounds two to five,
he sticks to his regular behavior ((1,1),(1,2),(0,3),(0,1)). To find how his experiments
aﬀect his payoﬀ, he plays the five round game at least two times. After he collects
his experiences from several plays, he may try to build a simple view of the five round
game. Since he only regards the first round as important, his view will involve only that
round. In addition, we will presume throughout this paper that his view is only a one
player game in that player 2 follows his regular behavior and is eﬀectively regarded as
an environment of player 1. Then, he may construct the simple game of Fig.1.2, where
he may still know that 6 available actions but knows only the resulting outcomes from
two actions. This game is much simpler than the objective game since it involves only
2 endpieces as opposed to more than 60 million. It requires only one comparison for
player 1 to determine that he should change his regular behavior to improve his payoﬀ
to 1.1017, which is close to the best possible payoﬀ 1.1121.
In this paper we will discuss how a player might inductively derive such a view from
such a complicated extensive form game. We also discuss under what conditions the
regular behavior of the players is found to be optimal in their inductively derived views.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that an inductively derived view may
become small and partial relative to the entire situation by introducing marking pieces
and tested actions. To show this, we will introduce a measure on the size of a view in
Section 8, which is simply the number of endnodes of an extensive game. With this
measure we can discuss how much the derived view is reduced relative to the objective
situation.
For the basic idea of inductive game theory, we can find various people treating
the same problem in the history, while a little has been discussed in the recent game
theory. Inductive game theory is related to Plato’s Republic [18], as well as the works
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of Bacon [1] and Hume [6]. Those works questioned and explored our limitations on
beliefs/knowledge. Inductive game theory succeeds this tradition, and, in fact, it is also
related to literature in sociology and social psychology in that human inductive behavior
depends critically on the social context (cf, Mead [17] for such discussions and Collins
[3] for more recent developments of those sociological ideas).
Our theory also shares some of the motivations behind the “bounded rationality” of
Simon [19] and the “standards of behavior” of von Neumann-Morgenstern [21]. Yet, it
is methodologically quite diﬀerent and has a more basic and close connection with the
epistemic logic approach to game theory (cf., Kaneko [7]). This basic connection is that
inductive game theory provides experiential foundations for the basic beliefs/knowledge
in epistemic logic.
We have deviated from the standard literature of game theory and economics (cf.,
Luce-Raiﬀa [14] for a classical textbook and Osborne-Rubinstein [16] for a recent text-
book). This deviation is needed since we want to focus on the origin and emergence of
beliefs/knowledge in individual experiences. This may sound similar to the case-based
decision theory of Gilboa-Schmeidler [5] and inductive logic of Carnap [2]. Our theory
is diﬀerent since it focuses on social structures and is methodologically more finitistic,
particularly in this paper.1 It also diﬀers from evolutionary game theory where a player
does not think about the social structure, and ”memories” are remaining only in the
distribution of strategies (cf. Weibull [20]).
Now, we should go further into the basic description of the theory.
1Kaneko [8] discussed methodological diﬃculties arising from infinities involved in game theory and
economics, and argued that more finitistic treatments of social problems are needed. Finite, small and
partial views considered here have the same spirit.
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2. Description of Inductive Game Theory
For discussions of the partial views obtained from limited experiences, we need some
understanding of inductive game theory. Here, we give a short version of the discourse
given in Kaneko-Kline [9], while focusing on the direction this paper takes.
1: Situations: Inductive game theory starts with a basic system of social situations as
described in the top part of Fig.2.1. Focussing on one social situation such as (Γo,mo)
and making a simplifying assumption that behaviors of players are separated from other
situations, the target social situation is represented as a sequence like the one in the
bottom part of the figure.
A specific situation (Γo,mo) consists of an extensive game Γo with memory functions
mo = (mo1, ...,m
o
n). The memory function m
o
i for each player i is a new concept to game
theory introduced in [9] and it describes local (short-term) memories occurring within
one play of Γo. This memory function is separated from the description of Γo and is
needed to describe the basic ingredients for a player’s subjective view.
The description of an extensive game we use is essentially the same as one in the sense
of Kuhn [13]. One diﬀerence is that an information piece, rather than an information set,
is attached to each node. We do not treat the concept of an information set as a basic
concept in our theory. Information sets fit well with players who are fully cognizant of
the game structure, but not with those who learn by their experiences. We will discuss
more about our treatment of information as pieces in Section 3.
2: Regular Behaviors and Limited Trial Deviations: The reader may wonder
how a player can, at first, behave without any a priori knowledge on the structure of
the social situation. In fact, we often behave without knowledge on the structure of the
situation. We simply make a choice or follow some learned rule of behavior. Players
6
typically behave following prescribed regular behavior patterns and occasionally make
some trial deviations. An extreme example is a default action, i.e., when a player meets
in a new decision situation, he chooses the first available action.
If players use only their regular behaviors, then they would only get a very narrow
view of the situation. In order to learn more about the structure of the game, they
make some trial deviations. In Kaneko-Kline [9], the unilateral trial domain and several
others were considered. In many games, like the coordination game with five rounds Γ5C
of Section 1, the unilateral trial domain becomes quite large and unmanageable. In the
present paper, we consider partial trial domains made possible by our introduction of
marked pieces and tested actions.
3: Limited Accumulations of Experiences as Long-term Memories: In addition
to the time constraints, a player is constrained by his cognitive ability to store his
experiences as memories. Some experiences are more likely to remain as long-term
memories, and some disappear from his mind. A player retains only a small set of long-
term memories relative to his full potential with unlimited trials and storage capacity.
The transformation from short-term memories to long-term ones has a lot of steps.
In Kaneko-Kline [9], these steps were summarized as an informal theory. In the present
paper we consider memories up to marked pieces and tested actions. Taking these
constraints into account, we adopt a specific memory function called the marked exact
perfect recall memory function. This memory function describes a player who recalls
exactly his part of his marked and tested paths within each play.
4: Induction from Long-term Memories to a View: A player constructs his
view from the long-term memories stored in his mind. Kaneko-Kline [9] gave a general
definition of inductively derived views, and showed that the inductive derivation of such
a view is sometimes impossible and sometimes generates many views, which are due
the general setting in [9]. In this paper, we avoid those diﬃculties by adopting the
exact perfect recall memory function, and can use a more stringent definition of the
inductively derived view than in [9]. This enables us concentrate our research on small
and partial views derived from experiences.
It is a contribution of the paper that the introduction of marked pieces and tested
actions make the inductively derived view is much smaller and more partial than the
original game situation. This suggests that a player may be able to consider his behavior
in a large game situation. Therefore, we have a natural connection to the next step.
5: Behavioral Use of an Inductively Derived View: After a player constructs a
view, he can use it to determine if his behavior is optimal. Kaneko-Kline [9] obtained
an experiential characterization of Nash equilibrium for the full objective game with
n-players. In this paper, due to the smallness and partiality of the views, there may be
a great distance between subjective optimality and objective optimality. Nevertheless,
we show that the subjectively optimal behaviors can be regarded as objectively optimal
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in a restricted sense. In this way, we can give a corresponding connection to Nash
equilibrium.
We will give a measure of the sizes of personal view as well as of the objective game,
which will be introduced in Section 8. This enables us to discuss the smallness and
partiality of personal views relative to the objective game in a meaningful manner.
3. Extensive Games, Memory Functions, and Behavior
This section summarizes the basic theory of extensive games, and introduces memory
functions. An extensive game Γ and a memory function mi are used both for the
description of an objective situation and for a subjective personal view. We use the
convention of describing the objective situation as (Γo,mo) and a personal view for a
generic player i as (Γi,mi).
3.1. Extensive Game with Partial Actions
Our definition of an extensive game for the objective description is, more or less, equiv-
alent to that of Kuhn [13]. The main diﬀerences are in the treatment of information and
memories. These diﬀerences are important for the coherent development of inductive
game theory. We discuss them after giving the definition of an extensive game. Then,
we will modify the definition to describe a personal view of player i.
For notational simplicity, we sometimes make use of a function with the empty do-
main, which we call an empty function. When the empty domain and some (possibly
nonempty) region are given, the empty function is uniquely determined.
Definition 3.1 (Extensive Games). Amarked extensive game Γ = ((X,<), (λ,W ),M,
{(ϕx, Ax)}x∈X , (π, N), h) is defined as follows:
K1(Game Tree): (X,<) is a finite tree;
K11: X is a finite non-empty set of nodes, and < is a partial ordering over X;
K12: {x ∈ X : x < y} is totally ordered with < for any y ∈ X;2
K13: X is partitioned into the set XD of decision nodes and the set XE of endnodes
so that every node in XD has at least one successor, and every node in XE has no
successors;3
K14: X has the smallest element x0, called the root.4
2The binary relation < is called a partial ordering on X iﬀ it satisfies (i)(irreflexivity): x ≮ x; and
(ii)(transitivity): x < y and y < z imply x < z. It is a total ordering iﬀ it is a partial ordering and
satisfies (iii)(totality): x < y, x = y or y < x for all x, y ∈ X.
3We say that y is a successor of x iﬀ x < y, and that y is an immediate successor of x, denoted by
x <I y, iﬀ x < y and there is no z ∈ X such that x < z and z < y.
4A node x is called the smallest element iﬀ x < y or x = y for all y ∈ X.
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K2(Information Function): W is a finite set of information pieces and λ : X →W is a
surjection with λ(x) 6= λ(z) for any x ∈ XD and z ∈ XE ;
K3(Marked Pieces): M is an arbitrary (possibly empty) subset of W ;
K4(Available Action Sets): Ax is a finite set of available actions for each x ∈ X;
K41: Ax = ∅ for all x ∈ XE;
K42: for all x, y ∈ XD, λ(x) = λ(y) implies Ax = Ay;
K43: for any x ∈ X, ϕx is a bijection from the set of immediate successors of x to Ax;
K5(Player Assignment): N is a finite set of players and π : W → 2N is a player
assignment with the following condition;
K51: |π(w)| = 1 if w ∈ {λ(x) : x ∈ XD} and π(w) = N if w ∈ {λ(x) : x ∈ XE};
K6(Payoﬀ functions): h = {hi}i∈N , where hi : {λ(x) : x ∈ XE} → R is a payoﬀ
function for player i ∈ N.
By K42, we can write Aw for Ax when λ(x) = w.
The main diﬀerences between Kuhn’s [13] definition and ours are:
(1) the use of information pieces rather than information sets consisting of nodes having
the same information;
(2) some information pieces are marked (see K3 above).
The diﬀerence (1) is essential to capture players who do not have full knowledge of
the social situation. We assume that an information piece is symbolically given, for
example, it is a sentence or simply a symbol. In one play of the game, a player obtains a
sequence of information pieces along the realized path. This is the source for information
about the game structure. The diﬀerence (2) is the source for smallness and partiality
of personal views. Now, let us discuss the diﬀerences (1) and (2) in detail.
In our interpretation, when a player arrives at a node x, he receives the information
piece w = λ(x). From the objective point of view, information sets consisting of nodes
can be derived from the above definition, i.e., a pair (w, i) of an information piece w and
a player i determines the corresponding information set {x : λ(x) = w and i ∈ π(x)}.
However, the player is not presumed to be able to carry out such a derivation before
he forms his beliefs about the structure of the game. He has too little knowledge about
the game structure to know which nodes fit where. Here, we emphasize that nodes
and, a fortiori, information sets are hypothetical constructs. On the other hand, the
information pieces are tangible to a player.
The set M of marked (information) pieces is additional to an extensive game of
Kuhn [13] and it is used to describe the part of the game that each player regards as
important. While the setM is arbitrary here, some requirement will be given in Section
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4. The roles of marked pieces will become clearer when we talk about a memory function
and trials.
An extensive game is said to be fully marked iﬀW =M . Given the setM of marked
pieces, we denoteMi = {w ∈M : i ∈ π(w)} as the set of player i’s marked pieces. From
the marked pieces, we can define the set of marked nodes:
XM = {x ∈ X : λ(x) ∈M} and XMi = XM ∩Xi, (3.1)
where Xi = {x ∈ X : i ∈ π · λ(x)} is the set of nodes for player i.
In this paper, we assume throughout that:
(3iA): the objective game Γo = ((Xo, <o), (λo,W o),Mo, {(ϕox, Aox)}x∈X , (πo, No), ho)
is given as an extensive game satisfying all the above conditions.
Furthermore, each piece of information w contains a minimal content of information:
M1: the set Aow of available actions;
M2: the value πo(w) of the player assignment πo if w is a decision piece;
M3: his own payoﬀ hoi (w) (as a numerical value) if w is an endpiece.
The information about the available actions, player assignment and payoﬀ contained in
M1, M2 and M3 is interpreted as written on each piece w. These assumptions are made
to simplify the description.
For the subjective use of an extensive game, we replace condition K43 by the fol-
lowing K430 :
K430: for any x ∈ X, ϕx is an injection from the set of immediate successors of x to Ax.
Here, some actions in Ax may not be associated with any immediate successors. The
reason for this is to allow for limited trials. All the available actions are still assumed to
be perceived by the player who moves at node x (i.e., M1), but their resulting paths are
not considered or understood by him unless he tries them. In the coordination game
Γ6C with precision in Section 1, according to M1, player 1 is informed that he has six
available actions at the root node, but he has tried only two actions (0, 2) and (1, 2).
Hence, in this personal view, the root has only two immediate successor nodes, which is
depicted in Fig.1.2. When we require only condition K430 for Γ, we call Γ as an extensive
game with partial actions.
A basic question for inductive game theory is how a player derives a view on the
social situation from his accumulated experiences. In this paper, we assume that
(3iiA): a personal view Γi = ((Xi, <i), (λi,W i),M i, {(ϕix, Aix)}x∈Xi , (πi, {i}), hi) is a
one-player extensive game with partial actions.
Since this is a 1-person game, only the payoﬀ function for player i is listed.
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Kaneko-Kline [9] considered extensive games in a weaker sense relaxing the root
node assumption and requiring ϕx in K43 to be only a function. This generalization
was to allow more general personal views that might include other players.
3.2. Memory and Behavior
In the standard game theory, the memory capability of a player is expressed in terms
of information sets.5 In inductive game theory, however, memory is the source for a
personal view. We need to separate the memory capability of a player from information
pieces and give an explicit definition of memory. Here, we define a memory function and
a strategy for a player. The memory function describes a player’s short-term memory.
Let us return to an extensive game Γ either with K43 or K430. For each node x, the
injection ϕx associates an action with an immediate successor of x. Using this, we define:
x <a y iﬀ x < y and either ϕx(y) = a or (ϕx(x
0) = a and x0 < y for some immediate
successor x0 of x). This means that action a at node x leads to node y. When x is an
endnode, ϕx is the empty function and is a bijection since Ax is empty by K41.
To discuss the personal memory capacity, the history up to an information piece
within the game Γ is important. We start with a definition of a path. The path to a node
x is defined as the unique sequence of nodes x1, ..., xm+1 = x satisfying {x1, ..., xm} =
{y ∈ X : y < x} and xt < xt+1 for i = 1, ...,m. Now, we define the history of information
pieces received and actions taken up to x. The (objective) history to x is given as:
θ(x) = h(λ(x1), a1), ..., (λ(xm), am),λ(x)i, (3.2)
where hx1, ..., xm+1i is the path to x and xt <at xt+1 for t = 1, ...,m. By K2 and K43
(or K430), θ(x) is uniquely determined, and is the entire history up to x.
Now, we focus on a node x for player i, and the history of his information pieces and
actions up to x. Let hxk1 , ..., xkl , xkl+1i be the subsequence of nodes for player i in the
path hx1, ..., xm+1i, i.e., the subsequence is defined by the property that i ∈ π · λ(xkt)
for t = 1, ..., l + 1. We define the history to x relative to player i as:
θ(x)i = h(λ(xk1), ak1), ..., (λ(xkl), akl),λ(xkl+1)i, (3.3)
where each akt is the action taken at xkt to connect to x. Since x = xm+1 belongs to
player i, we have xkl+1 = x. Finally, we define the marked history relative to player i,
which we denote by θ(x)Mi . The history θ(x)
M
i = h(λ(yt1), at1), ..., (λ(xts), ats),λ(yts+1)i
is the maximal subsequence of θ(x)i with λ(ytk) ∈M for all k = 1, ..., s+ 1.
Kaneko-Kline [9] discussed a variety of memory functions, some of which included
information pieces of other players. In this paper, we restrict attention to the marked
5Traditionally, the memories about his previous moves as well as the information he obtained previ-
ously are described by information sets in Γ. In this treatment, memories themselves are interpreted as
being written in an information set (cf., Kuhn [13] and Kline [12]).
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exact-perfect recall memory function.
Definition 3.2 (Marked Exact-Perfect Recall Memory Function): The MR-
memory function mMRi of player i is given as follows. For each node x ∈ Xi = {x ∈ X :
i ∈ π · λ(x)},
mMRi (x) =



{θ(x)Mi } if λ(x) ∈M
{hλ(x)i} if λ(x) /∈M.
(3.4)
In the following, we sometimes refer to the sequence θ(x)Mi in m
MR
i (x) as a memory
thread.
This memory function gives player i perfect recall about his own marked pieces and
tested actions within Γ. At unmarked pieces, he recalls nothing about the past and
receives only the current information piece. Note that he has no observations of other
players’ pieces, and no memories of them.
Now, we have completed the extensive game description and the memory function
describing short-term memories. These are used both for the description of the objective
situation and the personal view discussed in Section 1. In this paper,
(3iB): the objective description is given as a pair (Γo,mo) = (Γo, (mMR1 , ...,mMRn )) of
an n-person game Γo and a profile of memory functions mo = (mo1, ...,mon);
(3iiB): a personal view of player i is a pair (Γi,mMR), where Γi is a 1-player fully
marked extensive game with partial actions and mMR is the exact-perfect
memory function.
Recall that by “fully marked”, we mean that all pieces in Γi are marked by player i.
We use a behavior pattern to describe the behavior of players in the recurrent ob-
jective situation (Γo,mo) and also to describe a subjective strategy in a personal view
(Γi,mi) for player i. While the objective situation is repeated such as in the bottom
figure of Fig.2.1, we do not treat the behavior as a strategy over the repeated play, but
rather as a strategy, or behavior for one play.
Let Γ = ((X,<), (λ,W ),M, {(ϕx, Ax)}x∈X , (π, N), h) be an an extensive game with
partial actions and let mMRi be the marked memory function for player i ∈ N. We say
that a function σi defined over the set of decision nodes XDi = {x ∈ XD : i ∈ π · λ(x)}
is a behavior pattern (strategy) iﬀ it satisfies: for all x, y ∈ XDi ,
σi(x) = ϕx(x
0) for some immediate successor x0 of x; (3.5)
mMRi (x) = m
MR
i (y) implies σi(x) = σi(y). (3.6)
The first states that σi prescribes an “available” action to each decision node. The
second requires σi to depend only upon local memories, and is often called the mea-
surability condition. We say that an n-tuple of strategies σ = (σ1, ...,σn) is a profile of
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behavior patterns. We denote, by (σ0i,σ−i), the profile obtained from σ by substituting
σ0i for σi in σ.
We allow for multiple interpretations of a behavior pattern. When the player has
no idea about how to behave, for example, in some new game for society, his behavior
is based on a default choice. A behavior pattern for a slightly experienced player is
best interpreted as a norm or standard of behavior learned or copied by watching other
players in the same or a similar game. With these interpretations, we can avoid the
diﬃculty that a player may have no structural beliefs/knowledge of the game but still
has a well defined behavior pattern.
A final remark is that we assume no chance moves. We avoid chance moves because
their introduction gives certain conceptual problems and will create some unnecessary
complications. Without chance moves, a profile of behavior patterns σ = (σ1, ...,σn)
determines a unique path x1, ..., xm+1 in the extensive game Γ.
4. Trials, Unilateral Domains and Memory Kits
The source for a player’s personal view is his accumulated long-term memories of past
experiences. In Section 4.2, we formulate the partial unilateral trial domain of accumu-
lation and define a corresponding memory kit. The domain of accumulation is based
on some behavioral and cognitive postulates. First, in Section 4.1, we briefly discuss an
informal theory of postulates that suggest some partial unilateral trial domain of accu-
mulation [deleted fragment here]. See Kaneko-Kline [9] for an informal theory treating
the complete unilateral trial domain. Recall that the point of the present paper is to
treat small and partial domains when the unilateral trial domain becomes too large to
manage.
4.1. Informal Theory of Behavior, Trials and Memorization
The informal postulates we give are divided into two types: behavioral and cognitive.
The postulates in this paper have to do with the marked pieces and limited trials. We
start our informal theory with the behavioral postulates.
(1): Postulates for Behavior and Trials: The first postulate is the rule-governed
behavior of each player in the recurrent situation ..., (Γo,mo), ..., (Γo,mo), ...
Postulate BH1 (Regular Behavior): Each player, i, typically behaves regularly
following his behavior pattern σoi .
As already stated, player i may have adopted his regular behavior for some time
without thinking about it. Without assuming regular behavior for the players, a player
may not be able to extract any causal pattern from his experiences. In essence, learning
requires some regularity.
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After having followed some social regular behavior for some time, players might
wonder what would happen if they changed their behavior. To learn the pattern as well
as responses, a player may make some trial deviations. We postulate that such trial
deviations take place in the following manner.
Postulate BH2 (Occasional Deviations): Once in a while (infrequently), each
player unilaterally makes a trial deviation σi from his regular behavior σoi , and then
returns to his regular behavior.
Early on, such deviations may be unconscious or not well thought out. Neverthe-
less, a player might find that a deviation leads to a better outcome, and he may start
making deviations consciously in the future. Once he has become conscious of his be-
havior/deviation, he might make more and/or diﬀerent trials. In fact, this postulate
allows a player to make no trial deviation. This partiality will be stated in the following
two postulates.
Postulate BH3(Marked Pieces): Each player, i, makes a trial only at a marked
information piece.
Postulate BH4 (Limited Trials): Each player, i, experiments over only some possi-
ble behaviors.
The objective situation may be too large for a player with limited cognitive abilities
to handle. Consequently, each player marks some parts as being important and leave
the others unmarked. At these marked pieces, a player will consciously consider trials,
which may be only some subset of the full set of available actions. Formally, these two
postulates will be captured by restricting a trial strategy set given in Section 4.2.
(2): Cognitive Postulates: Each player may learn something through his regular
behavior and deviations. What he obtains in an instant is described by his short-term
memory, mi(x). For the transition from short-term memories to long-term memories,
there are various possibilities. Here we list some postulates based on bounded memory
abilities of a player.
The first postulate states that if a short-term memory does not occur frequently
enough, it will disappear from the mind of a player. We give this cognitive bound on a
player in postulate form as follows:
Postulate CP1 (Forgetfulness): If experiences (short-term memories) are infrequent
for player i, then they would disappear from a player’s mind.
The word “infrequent” is relative to player i as well as his consciousness. In contrast
to the behavior postulates, this postulate is more subjective.
In the face of the cognitive bound of forgetfulness on player i, only some memories
become lasting. We assume that the first type of memories that become lasting are the
regular ones since they occur quite frequently. The process of making a memory last by
repetition is known as habituation.
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Postulate CP2 (Habituation): A short-term (local) memory becomes lasting as
a long-term memory in the mind of player i by habituation, i.e., if he experiences
something frequently enough, it remains in his memory as a long-term memory.
By CP2, when all players follow their regular behavior patterns, the short-term
memories experienced by them will become long-term memories by habituation. The
remaining possibilities for long-term memories are the memories of trials made by some
players. We postulate that a player may consciously spend some eﬀort to memorize the
outcomes of his own trials.
Postulate CP3 (Conscious Memorization Eﬀort at Marked Pieces): Each
player makes a conscious eﬀort to memorize his marked pieces as well as the results
of his own trials at them.
Postulate CP3 means that when a player makes a trial deviation at a marked piece,
he also makes a conscious eﬀort to record his experience in his long-term memory. These
memories are more likely to remain if they are repeated frequently enough relative to
his trials. Since the players are presumed to behave independently, the trial deviations
involving multiple players will occur infrequently, even relative to one player’s trials.
Thus, the memories associated with multiple players’ trials do not remain as long-term
memories.
We have assumed that when a player receives an unmarked piece, he follows his
regular behavior without becoming conscious about it. We interpret CP3 as additionally
meaning that an experience at such an unmarked piece does not appear in the mind of
the player as a long-term memory, while such experiences along the regular path must
be frequent enough.
As we noted above, this is an informal theory, and may be compatible with various
formulations of the individual accumulated long-term memories. Nevertheless, here, we
interpret Postulates CP1 to CP4 and BH1 to BH3 as suggesting that we can concentrate
on a partial domain of accumulation of player which will be described formally in Section
4.2.
Since the above informal theory is highly finitistic, in particular, it includes forget-
fulness, we think that simulation studies of this informal theory and others may lead to
future progress with inductive game theory.
4.2. Collecting Information at Marked Pieces and Partial UT-domains
Kaneko-Kline [9] gave an informal theory suggesting a unilateral trial domain of accu-
mulation. Here, we focus on partial unilateral trial domains which are suggested by the
informal theory given above.
Consider the objective situation (Γo,mo) = (Γo, (mMR1 , ...,mMRn )), where the players
follow some given regular behavior patterns σo = (σo1, ...,σ
o
n). First, we assume the
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following very basic condition on the set of marked pieces Mo and σo = (σo1, ...,σ
o
n):
R0(Regular Marked Endnode): λo(x) ∈ Mo for the endnode x induced by σo =
(σo1, ...,σ
o
n).
Recall that any profile of behavior patterns σ = (σ1, ...,σn) determines a unique
path x1, ..., xm+1 to an endnode xm+1. We define the marked cane domain for player i
relative to σ as
DMci (σ) = {x1, ..., xm+1} ∩XoMi , (4.1)
where XoMi = {x ∈ Xo : i ∈ πo(x) and λo(x) ∈ Mo}. This is the sequence of marked
nodes for player i on the path determined by the behavior profile σ. A role of marked
information pieces is to allow player i to make trial deviations at those pieces. To
describe this role, we define a trial strategy set Σi to be a subset of the set Σoi of all
strategies for i satisfying the following three conditions:
T0(Regular Behavior): σoi ∈ Σi;
T1(Deviations at Marked Pieces Only): if σoi (x) 6= σi(x) for some σi ∈ Σi, then
λo(x) is marked;
T2(Closed with respect to Marking): Let x be an endnode, i.e., x ∈ XoE. If
y <σi(y) x for some marked node y ∈ XoMi and some σi ∈ Σi, then x is also marked.
The set Σi expresses permissible trial deviations for player i. Condition T0 is a basic
requirement. Condition T1 means that a trial deviation can be made only at a marked
piece. Condition T2 states that if an endnode follows a marked node by some trial
strategy in Σi, then that endnode is marked by player i.
A trivial example for a trial strategy set Σi is the singleton set {σoi }, which is the
smallest one and gives no freedom for player i to make trials. The largest one is given
as the set ΣoMi of all strategies σi satisfying, for all x ∈ Xoi ,
σi(x) ∈ Aox if λo(x) ∈Mo and σi(x) = σoi (x) if λo(x) /∈Mo. (4.2)
In this case, player i has the freedom to choose any action at a marked node, but keeps
to his regular action at unmarked nodes. In general, a set Σi satisfying T0-T2 is a
subset of ΣoMi .
We can now present the domain for accumulating memories in this paper. Consider
a pair (σo,Σi), where σo = (σo1, ...,σon) is the regular behavior profile for (Γo,mo) and
Σi is a trial strategy set for player i. Player i’s partial UT-domain for (σo,Σi) is given
as:
DUi (σ
o,Σi) =
S
σi∈Σi
DMci (σ
o
−i,σi). (4.3)
WhenΣi is the smallest set {σoi }, DMci (σo−i,Σi) coincides with the cane domainDMci (σo).
When Σi = ΣoMi , the domain of accumulation DUi (σo,ΣoMi ) is the set of marked nodes
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that are reachable by unilateral deviations at marked nodes. The UT-domain discussed
in Kaneko-Kline [9] is the special case where Moi =W
o
i and Σi = Σoi .
The domain DUi (σ
o,Σi) is the set of nodes reachable from the regular behaviors
and trials. Since nodes are hypothetical constructs from the viewpoint of the outside
observer, we need to translate this set in terms the constructs tangible for player i
himself. That is, we translate DUi (σ
o,Σi) to the corresponding memory kit. Let us
denote DUi (σ
o,Σi) by Di for simplicity. We say that TDi is a memory kit for domain
Di iﬀ
TDi =
S
x∈Di
moi (x); (4.4)
The kit TDi represents the entire set of memory threads remaining in the mind of player
i. In Section 5, it will be used to construct a skeleton for a personal view.
Coordination Game with Precision (2): Let us see the concepts developed above
in the coordination game with precision (Γ5C ,mo). To present marking and testing in a
systematic manner, we give the following constraints on Σi andMo. Let p and r positive
integers, where p is the number of marked nodes in each path and r is the number of
tested action at each marked node. Now, let Σpri be a set of information-independent
strategies in ΣoMi satisfying σoi ∈ Σ
pr
i and
(1-M): for each path {x1, ..., x11} to endnode x11,
¯¯{x ∈ {x1, ..., x11} : x ∈ XoMi }¯¯ = p;
(2-M): |{σi(x) : σi ∈ Σpri }| = r for all decision nodes x ∈ XoMi .
Note that by the assumption of information-independence, each strategy in Σpri is ex-
pressed as a sequence of actions such as ((ai1, bi1), ..., (ai5, bi5)). In (Γ5C ,mo), p can be
1, ..., 6, and r can be 1, ..., 6. When p = 1, player i makes no trials. This case is too
trivial.
Consider one case with p = 2 and r = 2 which corresponds to example given in the
introduction. We assume that only player i’s first decision nodes and the endnodes are
marked. We also specify a regular pair of (information-independent) strategies:
((ao11, b
o
11), ..., (a
o
15, b
o
15)) = ((0, 2), (1, 1), (1, 2), (0, 3), (0, 1)) (4.5)
((ao21, b
o
21), ..., (a
o
25, b
o
25)) = ((1, 3), (1, 1), (0, 2), (0, 2), (0, 3)) (4.6)
Now, we consider player 1’s test strategy set Σpr1 and the resulting memory kit. Suppose
that Σpr1 consists of two (information-independent) strategies:
Σpr1 = {((a11, bo11), (ao12, bo12), ..., (ao15, bo15)), a11 ∈ {0, 1}} . (4.7)
That is, player 1 makes only one additional trial of deviation for the a-type action
at round 1 and follows his regular behavior otherwise. In this case, the memory kit
TD1 =
S
x∈D1 m
o
1(x) of player 1 is given as
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{hλo(x0)i} ∪ {h(λo(x0), (a11, 2),λo(z1(a11)i : a11 ∈ {0, 1}}, (4.8)
where z1(0) and z1(1) are the endnodes induced by his a-type actions 0 and 1 at round
1, provided that otherwise the players follow the behaviors of (4.5) and (4.6). Thus, the
memory kit TD1 consists of only three memory threads.
Contrary to the tininess of (4.8), this set of threads could become gigantic when we
adopt the full setW o forMo and the set of all strategies Σi = Σoi . In this case, the trial
deviations for player i are all sequences ((a11, b11), ..., (a15, b15)). Hence, the cardinality
of D1 = DU1 (σ
o,Σ1) is the sum of reachable nodes and is given as
1 + 61 + 62 + 63 + 64 + 65 =
1
5
(66 − 1) = 9331. (4.9)
This is the same as the cardinality of the memory kit TD1 .
5. Inductively Derived Views
Now, we are in a state to consider how player i constructs his personal view from his
memory kit TDi =
S
x∈Di m
o
i (x) given by (4.4). It will be shown that the definition of
induction given in this paper is almost deterministic. The standard notion of induction
involves bold and sophisticated reasoning from a finite number of experiences (memories)
to a general rule (view), which suggests that there might be infinitely many candidates
for a view. Our definition of the deterministic induction method becomes possible by
the adoption of the (marked) exact-memory function for a player and the restricted
domain of accumulation. This allows us to focus on the problem of small and partial
views.
The memory kit TDi provides all the ingredients for a player’s induction. Our defi-
nition of induction is as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Inductively Derived View). A pair (Γi,mi) = (((Xi, <i), (λi,W i),
M i, {(ϕix, Aix)}x∈Xi , (πi, N i), hi),mi) is an inductively derived view (an i.d.view for
short) from the memory kit TDi iﬀ
P1(Construction of an Extensive Game): Γi is a fully marked 1-person extensive
game with partial moves and N i = {i} satisfying:
(a)(Preservation of the Informational Structure): the set Θ(Γi) of histories in Γi coin-
cides with TDi ;
(b)(Action Sets): for each node x ∈ Xi, Aix = Aoλi(x), i.e., the set A
i
x of available actions
at each x node in Γi is given as the set Ao
λi(x)
of available actions at information piece
λi(x) in Γo;
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(c)(Correct Payoﬀs): hi · λi(x) = hoi · λi(x) for each endnode x in Γi;
P2(Construction of a Memory Function): mi = mMR is the marked exact perfect
memory function for Γi.
Let us explain the above definition and give remarks on several points. Player
i constructs Γi from the accumulated long-term memories TDi . First, this game is
required to be fully marked, i.e., M i = W i. Since player i has constructed this game
in his mind, he is conscious of every information piece in the game Γi. Second, this
game is an extensive game with partial actions, i.e., only K430 is assumed in order to
accommodate the limited trials of a player.
Recall that the ingredients available to player i are given in the memory kit TDi .
Player i uses some additional hypothetical nodes Xi to construct a tree with the binary
relation <i . Then he attaches an information piece λi(x) from TDi to each node x and
consequently all pieces in W i come from TDi . By M1 in Section 3, the attached piece
λi(x) has the information about the available actions Ao
λi(x)
. Condition P1a requires
that the set Θ(Γi) of histories in Γicoincides with the kit TDi . Condition P1b requires
the set Aix of available actions in Γi to be Aoλi(x). Note also that Γ
i is a 1-player game
for player i himself, which is compatible with M2.
It follows from our assumptions on the memory function and domain of accumulation
that the endnodes in Xi will always be assigned endpieces from W o and the decision
nodes in Xi will always be assigned decision pieces from W o. Consequently, we can
require, in P1c, that the payoﬀ for λi(x) in Γi is the payoﬀ for λi(x) in Γo. The
availability of the payoﬀ information comes from M3 - the payoﬀ of player i is written
on each endpiece.
Condition P2 simply requires the memory function mi = mMR in Γi. Kaneko-Kline
[9] gave a more general formulation of P2, but we do not need such a general formulation
since we assume the exact perfect recall memory functions for the objective situation
and the subjective description.
Now, consider the existence and uniqueness of an i.d.view. Both are answered in
the aﬃrmative in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Existence and Uniqueness up to Isomorphisms). Let Di =
DUi (σ
o,Σi) be a partial UT-domain.
(1): There exists an inductively derived view (Γi,mi) from TDi .
(2): Let (Γ,m) and (Γ0,m0) be two i.d.views of player i from TDi . The two views are
isomorphic in the sense that there is a bijection ψ : X → X 0 such that for all x, y ∈ X,
(a) ψ(x) <0 ψ(y) if and only if x < y; (b) λ(x) = λ0(ψ(x));
(c) Ax = A0ψ(x); (d) ϕx(y) = ϕ
0
ψ(x)(ψ(y));
(e) hi(x) = h0i(ψ(x)); (f) m(x) = m
0(ψ(x)).
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Proof.(1): Under the assumptions of this paper, the memory kit TDi has enough in-
formation to construct an i.d.view. First, we let Xi = TDi . Indeed, if a sequence
h(w1, a1), ..., (wk, ak), wk+1i is in TDi , any initial segment h(w1, a1), ..., (wl, al), wl+1i (l <
k) is also in TDi . For any two sequences hξ, vi and hη, wi in TDi we write hξ, vi <i hη, wi
iﬀ hξ, vi is an initial segment of hη, wi. Then, (TDi , <i) can be regarded as a tree sat-
isfying K1. Next, we define W i to be the set of information pieces that appear in TDi .
Then, let M i = W i; the game is fully marked, let N i = {i}; the game is a 1-person
game involving only player i, and let mi = mMR to satisfy P2.
The components λi, {Aix}x∈Xi , and hi are then simply derived from XDi = TDi using
M1 and M3. Specifically, for each x = h(w1, a1), ..., (wk, ak), wk+1i in TDi , we let λi (x)
= wk+1, Aix = A
o
wk+1
, and the payoﬀs are defined by hoi .
The treatment of {ϕix}x∈Xi is a little more delicate, but under our assumptions it is
uniquely defined. If x = h(w1, a1), ..., (wk, ak), wk+1i is in TDi and it has no immediate
successors, then ϕix is the empty function. Otherwise, x = h(w1, a1), ..., (wk, ak), wk+1i
has an immediate successor y = h(w1, a1), ..., (wk, ak), (wk+1, ak+1), wk+2i, and then
ϕix(y) = ak+1.
(2): Let θ(x) and θ0(x) be the objective histories up to nodes x in Γ and x0 in Γ0. By P1a,
Θ(Γ) = Θ(Γ0). Additionally, since Γ and Γ0 are both rooted trees, θ is a bijection fromX
to Θ(Γ) and θ0 is a bijection from X 0 to Θ(Γ0). Hence, we can define ψ(x) = θ0−1 ◦ θ(x)
for any node x in Γ. Thus, ψ(x) is well defined and is a bijection from X to X 0. This
bijection satisfies (a) to (f).
The specific i.d.view (Γi,mi) given in the proof of Theorem 5.1.(1) is constructed
directly from the memory kit TDi treating each memory thread in TDi as a node. For
this reason, we call this i.d.view the memory-thread representation.
We can construct another i.d.view from Di simply using Di as the set of nodes in
the personal view. We call this view the original-node representation. While this latter
view is more convenient in the subsequent analysis, it is not natural from the viewpoint
of player i since he observes only the information pieces, rather than the nodes in Di.
This view is obtained simply by restricting the objective extensive game (Γo,mo) to Di.
All the components of (Γi,mi), except {(ϕix, Aix)}x∈Xi , are obtained from (Γo,mo) by
restricting attention to Xi = Di.
Formally, those components are defined as follows: <i= (<o) ∩ (Di ×Di), λi is the
restriction of λo to Di, W i = M i = {λi(x) : x ∈ Di}, πi(x) = N i = {i} for all x ∈ Di
and hi(x) = hoi (x) for all x ∈ Di∩XoE. The tree (Xi, <i) may not inherit the immediate
successorship in (Xo, <o). Let x ∈ Xi be the immediate successor y ∈ Xi with respect
to <i .When it inherits the immediate successorship from Γo, we define ϕix(y) = ϕox(y).
If not, we find a node yo in Xo so that it is the immediate successor of x and also a
predecessor of y with respect of <o . Then, we define ϕix(y) = ϕ
o
x(x). Now, we have the
original node representation (Γi,mi). We can verify that this is an i.d.view, too.
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Theorem 5.1.(2) states that this original-node representation is isomorphic to the
memory-thread representation given in the proof of Theorem 5.1.(1).
Coordination Game (Γ5C ,mo) with Precision (3): Recall that we specified a regular
pair of (information-independent) strategies in (4.5) and (4.6). These strategies give
payoﬀs (0.1017, 0.1017) to the players. Incidentally, the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs in the
objective game Γo = Γ5C are (1.1121, 1.1121).
First, consider the size of the i.d.view when Mo is the full set W o and Σ1 is the
set of all information independent strategies in Γ5C . In this case, as calculated in (4.9),
the memory kit TD1 has 9331 memory threads. Since any i.d.view is isomorphic to
the memory-thread representation, any i.d.view has also 9331 nodes. In fact, we will
argue in Section 8 that the number of endnodes is more convenient to consider. In this
example, the number of endnodes of any i.d.view Γ1 is 65 = 7, 776. This number is
already much smaller than the number of endnodes (65)2 = 60, 466, 176 of the objective
situation (Γo,mo).
Second, let us go to the case (p, r) = (2, 2) considered in Section4 and the introduc-
tion. In that case, the memory kit TDi is given as (4.8), which consists of 3 memory
threads. The inductively derived view (Γ1,m1) is constructed from those 3 memory
threads. It is extremely simple having only 2 branches and 2 endnodes, depicted in Fig.
1.2. In this view, one endnode gives the payoﬀ 0.1017 and the other gives 1.1017.
The point of this example is to show that player 1 obtains a very small partial i.d.view
from marking only a few seemingly important parts of the game and restricting possible
actions. If marking is adequate, it gives almost the best payoﬀ, i.e., 1.1017 relative to
the Nash payoﬀ 1.1121. However, it depends upon a choice of marking and possible
actions. Maybe, some player only marks unimportant pieces, and he does not improve
his payoﬀ by making more trials. Additionally, testing the wrong actions might not
help either. In this sense, we can regard the set of tested actions as a type of marking,
where a player marks the actions to be tested that he regards as important.
6. Strategic Use of an Inductively Derived View
After player i derives his view (Γi,mi) from the memory kit TDi , he may think about
an optimal strategy in that view, and he may also think about how to use it in the
objective situation. The scenario is described in Fig.6.1, where the steps of finding an
optimal strategy and bringing it back correspond to the lower part of the figure.
Let (Γi,mi) be an i.d.view from the memory kit TDi in the objective game (Γo,mo)
with the regular behavior patterns σo = (σo1, ...,σ
o
n). To define a subjectively optimal
behavior strategy, we consider a strategy τ i in the view (Γi,mi). Each strategy τ i in
(Γi,mi) determines a unique path to an endnode x in (Γi,mi), and defines the endpiece
λi(x), which we denote by λi(τ i).
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Figure 6.1:
Now, player i looks for a strategy τ1i in (Γi,mi) that optimizes his subjective payoﬀ
hii, i.e.,
hi(λi(τ1i )) ≥ hi(λi(τ i)) for all strategies τ i in (Γi,mi). (6.1)
Since (Γi,mi) is a finite 1-person game, he has an optimal strategy τ1i . Now, we meet
four questions:
Q61: how does player i bring τ1i back to the objective situation (Γo,mo)?
Q62: what relationships does the optimal strategy have to the regular behavior σoi ?
Q63: what is the conceptual status of the optimal strategy relative to Nash equilibrium?
Q64: what is the size of the above optimization problem (6.1)?
We will discuss these questions in the remainder of this paper. In this section, we
consider only Q61 and Q62. The question Q63 will be discussed in Section 7 and Q64
will be discussed in Section 8.
Let us start with Q61. Observe that player i first looks for an optimal plan τ1i in
the i.d.view (Γi,mi). After he finds one, his next problem is how to bring τ1i back to the
objective situation (Γo,mo). The strategy τ1i is a plan in (Γi,mi), but the player would
like to use it to modify his regular behavior σoi by τ
1
i .
Since (Γi,mi) may have diﬀerent nodes to those in (Γo,mo), it may appear that the
player would not be able to apply his strategy τ1i easily to (Γo,mo). However, strategies
are eﬀectively defined over the set of memories by (3.6), so this is not a problem. All
memory threads in (Γi,mi) are those in TDi , which are memory threads for player i in
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(Γo,mo). This fact enables us to make the following definition: for all x ∈ Xoi ,
σ1i (x) =



τ1i (y) if m
o
i (x) = m
i(y) and y ∈ Xi;
σoi (x) otherwise.
(6.2)
Note that for each x ∈ Xoi , the node y in the above if-clause is uniquely determined by
P1a and mi = mMR. This definition states that player i follows τ1i in (Γo,mo) whenever
a local memory described in his personal view (Γi,mi) occurs, and otherwise he resorts
to σoi . This is the answer to Q61.
Now, we suppose that only player i adjusts his behavior in the above manner. The
profile of regular behavior patterns σo = (σo1, ...,σ
o
n) changes into (σ
o
−i,σ
1
i ) and we have
the following observation, which is stated as a theorem for a purpose of comparisons
with later theorems. This is our answer to Q62.
Theorem 6.1 (Optimality brought back). Let (Γi,mi) be an i.d.view from the kit
TDi with the trial strategy set Σi. Then, a strategy τ1i in (Γi,mi) is optimal in the sense
of (6.1) if and only if σ1i is optimal in Σi relative to σo−i in the objective game (Γo,mo),
i.e.,
hoi (λ
o(σ1i ,σ
o
−i)) ≥ hoi (λo(σi,σo−i)) for all σi ∈ Σi. (6.3)
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, all i.d.views are game theoretically isomorphic. Hence, we can
assume that (Γi,mi) is the original node representation defined in the end of Section 5.1.
Also, player i’s regular behavior is fixed for the unmarked nodes, and the other players’
regular behaviors σo−i are entirely fixed. Hence, the set of nodes reachable by some σi ∈
Σi are relevant in (6.3) and are the same as Di = DUi (σo,Σi) =
S
σi∈Σi D
Mc
i (σ
o
−i,σi).
Now, consider any σi ∈ Σi. We denote the restriction of σi to Di by τ i. Then, the
endnode defined by (σi,σo−i) in (Γo,mo) is the same as the endnode defined by τ i in
(Γi,mi).Hence, we have hoi (λo(σi,σo−i)) = hi(λi(τ i)). Thus, (6.3) is equivalent to (6.1).
This theorem states that an i.d.view helps player i to choose an optimal behavior in
the objective situation. This objective optimality is relative only to the trial strategy
set Σi. This theorem is not the end of inductive game theory. Once player i brings back
his optimal strategy σ1i to the objective situation, he starts playing σ
1
i as his regular
behavior. Here we see that the regular behavior can now be regarded as optimal in
a restricted sense. The situation has returned to the top row of Fig.6.1, and his new
regular behavior may generate new experiences for other players.
· · · −→ σo −→ (σ1i ,σo−i) −→ (σ1j ,σ1i ,σo−ij) −→ · · · (6.4)
If some other player j constructs a new i.d.view and finds an optimal strategy τoj , then
the process continues. When he brings σ1j back to the objective situation, the regular
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behavior is changed again. In this case, the behavior σ1i of player i may no longer
be optimal objectively in the sense of (6.3). We presume that this process of analysis
does not proceed period to period, but each step needs several periods. In this way,
the i.d.views and behavior of the players are emerging. In the next section we look at
stationary outcomes of this process.
7. Partial Nash Equilibrium and the Restricted Objective Game
As the players are moving through the steps in the diagram of Fig.6.1, the i.d.views
and regular behavior patterns might be changing. This process may continue for a
long time. Once the behavior patterns become “stationary”, the state can be regarded
as a Nash equilibrium. By the word “stationary” we mean that each player reaches
an i.d.view from his test set where he does not modify his behavior anymore. This
stationary regular behavior patterns a Nash equilibrium, which is seen from Theorem
6.1 in the game having the restricted domain experienced by the players. This result
is stated as the first theorem of this section. We then rewrite this theorem as Theorem
7.2, which is tailored to suit our exploration into the complexity of an i.d.view as well
as of a Nash equilibrium. This will be the subject of Section 8.
Theorem 7.1 (Decomposition of Nash Equilibrium). Let (Γi,mi) be an i.d.view
from the kit TDi with the trial strategy set Σi for all i ∈ No. Then, the profile σo =
(σo1, ...,σ
o
n) of regular behaviors is a Nash equilibrium in the strategy sets Σ1×· · ·×Σn in
(Γo,mo), i.e., it satisfies (6.3) for each i ∈ No, if and only if for all i ∈ No, the restricted
strategy τ1i in (Γi,mi) defined by
τ1i (x) = σ
o
i (y) if m
i(x) = moi (y) (7.1)
is optimal in the sense of (6.1) in (Γi,mi).
We do not give a proof of this result since it is a direct consequence of Theorem 6.1.
Observe that the restricted strategy τ1i is well-defined by the conditions for (Γi,mi).
This theorem is a variant of the characterization concept of Nash equilibrium in Kaneko-
Kline [9], except that it takes a trial strategy set Σi into account. The present point is
the equivalence result in the restricted sense.
It would be easier to restate Theorem 7.1 from the viewpoint of the objective-
node representation of an i.d.view. Recall that the node representation (Γi,mi) is ob-
tained by restricting the objective game (Γo,mo) to the partial UT-domainDUi (σo,Σi) =S
σi∈Σi D
Mc
i (σ
o
−i,σi). Consider the union of those D
U
i (σ
o,Σi)’s:
DU =
S
i∈No
DUi (σ
o,Σi). (7.2)
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Now, we have the restriction of (Γo,mo) to the union DU , which we will denote by
(Γor,mor). This game (Γor,mor) is an extensive game with partial actions. We have the
restriction σor of the profile σo to DU . Then Theorem 7.1 is restated as follows:
Theorem 7.2 (Nash Equilibrium in the Restricted Game). Let (Γi,mi) be
an i.d.view from the kit TDi with the trial strategy set Σi for all i ∈ No. Then, the
restriction σor of σo = (σo1, ...,σ
o
n) to D
U is a Nash equilibrium in the game (Γor,mor)
if and only if for all i ∈ No, the restricted strategy τ1i defined by (7.1) is optimal in the
sense of (6.3) in (Γi,mi).
Proof. The domain DU is simply the union of DUi (σ
o,Σi)’s. Each DUi (σo,Σi) is the set
of marked nodes obtained by trials in Σi for player i from σor. The utility maximization
in the sense of (6.3) in (Γi,mi) is equivalent to the utility maximization of player i in
the definition of Nash equilibrium for player i. Hence, when we require the optimality
in sense of (6.3) in (Γi,mi) for all players i, σor = (σor1 , ...,σorn ) is a Nash equilibrium in
the restricted game (Γor,mor), and vice versa.
By this theorem, we can reduce the problem of evaluating a partial Nash equilibrium
into the size of (Γor,mor). We will discuss the size of this game and other games in
Section 8.
8. Sizes of Inductively derived Views and Restricted Games
In Section 5.2, we saw how an i.d.view is typically very small relative to the objective
game. There, we employed the definition of the size of the view as the number of
endnodes - - the width of the tree. In fact, this definition reflects the complexity of
the optimization problem for a player with a given i.d.view. On the other hand, since
the number of all nodes in the i.d.view is exactly the same as the number of memory
threads in the memory kit TDi , an alternative definition of the size of the i.d.view is the
number of all nodes in the view. In what follows, we argue that the number of endnodes
is an eﬀective measure of the size of a view.
8.1. Sizes of Trees
Since we are interested in measuring the “complexity” of an i.d.view and/or decision
making, the reader might recall the computational complexity in logic and computer
science. The concept is to measure the size of a Turing machine to compute a given
mathematical problem (of instances) (see Garey-Johnson [4] for general discussions of
this issue, and see McLennan-Tourky [15] and its references for game theoretical ap-
plications). This notion of computational complexity does not distinguish between two
problem instances in a meaningful manner. Our target, on the other hand, is to con-
sider the “size” of an instance of an i.d.view or the game. An idea similar to ours was
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discussed in Kaneko-Suzuki [11] to measure the necessary size of inferences in epistemic
logic.
First, we show the following lemma, which was given in a context of epistemic logic
in Kaneko-Suzuki [11].
Lemma 8.1 (Kaneko-Suzuki [11]). Let T be a finite tree with the nonterminal nodes
1, ..., k with mt branches at each nonterminal node t.
(1): The total number of nodes is given as
kP
t=1
mt + 1. (8.1)
(2): Let n1, ..., n` be the non-end nodes with mnt > 1 for all t = 1, ..., `. Then the
number of endnodes of T is given as
P`
t=1
mnt − (`− 1). (8.2)
Under the assumption that each decision node has at least two branches, the follow-
ing theorem gives the precise lower and upper bounds of the total number of nodes in
a tree, which are characterized by the number of endnodes. This result is interpreted
as meaning that the number of endnodes η(T ) reflects well the total number of nodes
τ(T ).
Theorem 8.2 (Lower and Upper Bounds for the Total Number of Nodes).
Let T be a finite tree where each decision node has at least 2 branches. Let η(T ) be the
number of endnodes in T, and let τ(T ) be the number of all nodes in T. Then we have
η(T ) + 1 ≤ τ(T ) ≤ 2η(T )− 1. (8.3)
Furthermore, these bounds are taken by some trees T1 and T2 with at least 2 branches
such that τ(T1) = τ(T2) = τ(T ).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary tree T 0 having the number of endnodes η(T ). Then, η(T 0)
is given as the formula of (8.3), i.e.,
Pk
t=1mt + 1 − k. Now, keeping
Pk
t=1mt + 1 − k
as constant η(T ), we change k, i.e., T 0 is changed by k. Observe that
Pk
t=1mt + 1 is
minimized at k = 1. We can find a tree with k = 1, and denote this tree by T1. Then it
holds that:
η(T ) + 1 = η(T1) + 1 = τ(T1).
Again, keeping
Pk
t=1mt+1−k as constant η(T ), we change k. Observe that
Pk
t=1mk+1
is maximized, when mt’s are all 2. We find a tree T2 so that η(T2) = η(T ) and k =
η(T ) − 1. Then, τ(T2) =
Pη(T )−1
t=1 mt + 1 = 2(η(T ) − 1) + 1 = 2η(T ) − 1. In Fig.8.1,
examples of T1 and T2 are given for the number of endnodes 4.
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Figure 8.1:
The point of Theorem 8.2 is that the total number of endnodes η(T ) is not very
diﬀerent from the total number of nodes τ(T ). As a measure to captured rough magni-
tudes of trees, we can employ either η(T ) or τ(T ). Hence, even the number of memory
threads in TDi is reflected by the number of endnodes of an i.d.view Γi. For calculation
convenience, we have used the total number of endnodes η(T ).
The above theorem is stated under the assumption that each decision node of those
trees has at least two actions. When a tree T has s nodes with single actions, (8.3) is
modified into
η(T ) + 1 + s ≤ τ(T ) ≤ 2η(T )− 1 + s, (8.4)
since an addition of such a node increases the total number τ(T ) of nodes by one. It
is natural to assume that at each marked piece, a player makes a new trial. Then, s
becomes zero. In general, s would be a small number in our context.
8.2. Sizes of the Optimization Problem using an I.D.View
Here we consider the question Q64 of Section 6 which is about the size of the optimization
problem of a player. Since (Γi,mi) is a 1-person game with a tree structure, a strategy
is a complete plan of contingent actions and is already quite complicated. Looking at
the optimization problem (6.1) carefully, however, we find that a relevant variable in the
optimization problem is an endpiece. Under the assumption that the pieces attached to
the endnodes are all distinct, we can focus on endnodes rather than endpieces. Suppose
also that an optimal endpiece is chosen while player i himself does not yet know its
optimality. The verification of its optimality requires the player to compare its payoﬀ
with the payoﬀs from the other endnodes. The number of these verifications is η(Γi)−1.
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Of course, this is the most fortunate case for finding an optimal endnode. Thus, the
number of endnodes is one measure of the size of the optimization problem (6.1).
We can think about this argument more formally using a certain game theoretical
concept. We denote the realization equivalence relation over the set of strategies in
(Γi,mi) by ∼, i.e., τ 0i ∼ τ 00i iﬀ λi(τ 0i) = λi(τ 00i ). Recall that λi(τ i) is the endpiece induced
by τ i in (Γi,mi). Each strategy τ 0i defined an equivalence class [τ 0i] = {τ 00i : τ 0i ∼ τ 00i }.
Since each strategy is characterized by the induced endpiece, the number of equivalence
classes is the same as the number of endpieces in Γi. Thus, one possible measure of the
size of the optimization problem (6.1) is the number of pieces of Γi minus 1. Under the
assumption that all endpieces are distinct, it becomes η(Γi)− 1.
Although the number of endnodes in the i.d.view can be regarded as representing the
size of the optimization problem, this optimization process may not be easily separated
from the inductive processes. Thus, it is not a good idea to take the number η(Γi)− 1
as the exact number for optimization. Rather, we should take the number of endnodes
as a rough measure representing the size of the entire inductive processes including op-
timization. When the value of this measure is large, we have the implication that the
inductive derivation as well as its use for optimization could be diﬃcult. Small sizes
are required for individual player to be able to make a successful induction and use the
result eﬀectively.
Coordination Game (Γ5C ,mo) with Precision (4): Now, let us return to the co-
ordination game Γ5C with precision, Consider the size of the i.d.view when Mo = W o
and Σi = Σoi . In this case, the number of nodes is 9331, and the number of endnodes
is 65 = 7, 776. Literally speaking, the optimization problem (6.1) needs at least 65 − 1
comparisons to choose an optimal strategy. In our ordinary life, this number of compar-
isons is enormously large and, perhaps, exceeds our individual capacities. Nevertheless,
the situation we are considering is a rather common one that we may face often, and
that we manage to deal with somehow.
One way we manage to deal with such situations is to simplify them by marking and
limiting our tests. As we saw, the number of endnodes to consider becomes suddenly
very small when we give restrictions on marked pieces and tested actions.
8.3. Relative Sizes of I.D.Views to the Restricted Games and Original Game
Using the measure η, let us consider the relative sizes of an i.d.view to the original game
Γo and/or to the restricted game Γor defined in Section 7. First, we show that the
restricted game Γor is obtained by summing up individual i.d.views {(Γi,mi)}i∈No .
Theorem 8.3 (Size of the Restricted Game). The number of endnodes η(Γor) of
the restricted game Γor is given as
η(Γor) =
P
i∈No
(η(Γi)− 1) + 1 =
P
i∈No
(η(DUi )− 1) + 1. (8.5)
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Proof. Since Γor is obtained by restricting Γo to DU =
S
i∈No D
U
i , it suﬃces to evaluate
the size of DU =
S
i∈No D
U
i . Since each Γi is isomorphic to DUi , we have the second
equality. Hence, we should show that the number of endnodes DU =
S
i∈No D
U
i is
given as in
P
i∈No(η(D
U
i )− 1) + 1. The endnode induced by the regular behavior σo =
(σo1, ...,σ
o
n) is commonly included in D
U
i and D
U
j (i 6= j). Any other endnode in DUi is
specific to a deviation by player i. Hence, the unique endpoint is commonly included in
DU1 , ...,D
U
n . Thus, we have η(D
U ) =
P
i∈No(η(D
U
i )− 1) + 1.
Theorem 8.3 holds for any marked set Mo and trial strategy set Σi, and states that
η(Γor) is almost the sum of the sizes of η(Γi)’s. On the other hand, η(Γo) is fixed
and independent of Mo and the trial strategy set Σi. Typically, η(Γo) is much greater
than η(Γor). The maximum number for η(Γor) is obtained by the fully marked case
Mo = W o where Σi is the maximum set Σoi for all i. Even in this case, η(Γor) may be
far smaller than η(Γo). One example was discussed in Section 5.2, where η(Γo) = 65×2
and η(Γor) = 2× 65 − 1. We extend this calculation result in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.4 (Sizes of the Objective Game). Assume that Γo = Γo(`) is a layered
game with ` decision layers (` ≥ 1), i.e., in every path to an endnode, the players
move in the same ordering (i1, ..., i`), and the action set of player ik at the k-th layer
(k = 1, ..., `) is independent of the history. Let Γo(`) be fully marked and fully tested,
i.e., W o =Mo,and Σi = Σoi for all i ∈ No. Then number of endnodes η(Γo) is given as
η(Γo(`)) =
Q
i∈No
η(Γi). (8.6)
Proof. We prove the assertion by induction over `.
In the induction base case of ` = 1, we have η(Γo(1)) = η(Γi1). Also, any player
i 6= i1 experiences only the regular endnode, and so view consists of only one node.
Hence, η(Γo(1)) =
Q
i∈No η(Γi(1)).
Now, suppose the induction hypothesis that (8.6) holds up to a natural number `.
Then, we consider the case of ` + 1. This game is denoted by Γo(` + 1). We ignore
payoﬀs since we consider the sizes of trees only. Then, by the inductive hypothesis,
η(Γo(`)) =
Q
i∈No η(Γi(`)).
First, consider the case where i`+1 diﬀers from any of i1, ..., i`. Then, η(Γi`+1(`+1))
is the number of actions for player i`+1. Also, η(Γi(`)) = η(Γi(`+1)) for all i 6= i`+1, and
η(Γi`+1(`)) = 1. Since the number η(Γo(`+1)) is obtained by η(Γo(`))× η(Γi`+1(`+1)),
we have, using the induction hypothesis for `,
η(Γo(`+ 1)) = η(Γo(`))× η(Γi`+1(`+ 1))
=
Q
i
η(Γi(`))× η(Γi`+1(`+ 1)) = Q
i∈No
η(Γi(`+ 1)).
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Second, consider the case where i`+1 = it. Then, the above argument should be
modified slightly for player i`+1. We denote the number actions at decision ` + 1 by
|A`+1| . Then, η(Γi`+1(`+ 1)) = η(Γi`+1(`))× |A`+1| , and η(Γi(`+ 1)) = η(Γi(`)) for all
i 6= i`+1. Hence, we have, using the induction hypothesis for `,
η(Γo(`+ 1)) = η(Γo(`))× |A`+1| =
Q
i
η(Γi(`))× |A`+1|
=
Q
i6=i`+1
η(Γi(`))× (η(Γi`+1(`))× |A`+1|) =
Q
i∈No
η(Γi(`+ 1)).
9. Conclusions
We have focussed on the small and partial views that players with limited cognitive
abilities might derive from playing large and complicated games. This analysis follows
the scenario of inductive game theory spelled out in Kaneko-Kline [9]. That scenario
gave experiential foundations for noncooperative game theory, particularly, extensive
game theory, but in [9], potential diﬃculties and obstacles are analyzed. In this paper,
we avoided obstacles by focusing on the (marked) exact perfect recall memory function
mMRi and on the (marked) unilateral domain for trial and error. The introduction of
“marked pieces” and “tested actions” was essential for making further progress in large
and complicated games. We have found a path to allow players to apply the standard
tools of game theory to their small and partial views.
The introduction of “marked” and “tested actions” has removed some theoretical
diﬃculties, particularly, when an extensive game theory is used in inductive game the-
ory. Without these new notions, the number of necessary trials might become quickly
unmanageable as the objective game situation gets larger, which was shown by using
the example in Section 5.2. In such a large game, the required periods for accumulating
a suﬃcient number of experiences would be too long. Another diﬃculty is that even
if a player has accumulated suﬃcient experiences, the number of ingredients (memory
threads) could be too large to cook (construct) a subjective view. Finally, even if such a
complicated view is successfully derived, it might be unmanageable from the viewpoint
of decision making as there would be too many alternatives to check.
In Section 8, we introduced a measure for evaluating the sizes of i.d.views, the
restricted game and the objective game. According to this measure, we could show
how i.d.views may increase in size quite quickly and become unmanageable even in
situations that are regarded as simple and straightforward in standard game theory.
We argued in favour of the reduction of the objective situation into a small view by
the introduction of marked pieces and tested actions from a player’s viewpoint. In
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Section 7, we considered this type of reduction from the objective point of view. In
fact, this procedure has some similarity to practices by game theorists and economists
who construct small models by choosing seemingly important players, information and
actions from a large socioeconomic situation. If one treats the original large situation
directly, it would be impossible to analyze.
It may be asked how marked pieces and tested actions are chosen as important
variables for a player. So far, the choice of those variables is still exogenous in our
theory. Recall that it is our starting assumption that a player has no a priori knowledge
of the structure of the objective situation. Under this assumption, the player has no
a priori criteria for the choices of marked pieces and tested actions. This is similar to
a scientist in the beginning of his research. An accumulation of experiences will help,
and communication with other researchers may help more. Thus, some criteria for the
choice of marked pieces and tested actions may be emerging by continuing trial and
error, and by communicating with other players.
In this paper, we have focused on a personal view which is a 1-person game. We
could extend this to a many player game where each player observes the behavior of
other players and treat them as following only their regular behavior patterns. Then we
would get essentially the same results given in the present paper. However, an interesting
development happens when a player starts to think about the decision making of other
players. Then, he sees the game as a social situation and might ask why the other
players behave the way they do and how he and they might improve on their present
social outcomes.
For this extension, there are several ways to proceed. One way for a player to
learn about the motivations and behavior of other players is for him to step into the
shoes of the other players by taking on their “roles”. Then, he uses this extended set
of memories to extend his i.d.view. This would give him a larger and more accurate
view of the social situation. Another way to proceed is for the players to communicate
their personal experiences to each other. For this to be successful, “marking” and small
views become important as the objects for communication must be abstract enough to
be understood by others. We believe that an analysis of communication and experience
by “role-playing” has a great potential to extend the scope of our inductive game theory
and we plan to undertake this analysis in a separate paper.
For those issues, the sociological notions of “social roles and expectations” (see
Collins [3], Chap.7) may become important. In a social situation, a “player” is of-
ten identified to be a social role rather than a specific individual. For example, the
department head is a social role in a university, which is taken by one person at a time,
and that person is expected to behave in a certain manner. In this case, diﬀerent people
could take the same role in the same or similar situations. They may collect diﬀerent
experiences, a fortiori, diﬀerent views of the situation. A former department head can
also instruct the present head on how to behave.
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In sum, we have used inductive game theory to show how players with limited
cognitive abilities might successfully construct simplified views in the face of complicated
social situations. This has been one step in the direction of tailoring game theory to
address social and economic problems in a better way. We believe that this paper may
open vast new fields for studying social interactions.
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